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The Academie Draft for a Bma of the Law of Obligations'
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1. In response of the need for a national Law of Contract and of Obligations the
   National law Reform Agency (Badan Pembinaan Hukztm IVtisionaD of the
   Department of Justice fbrmed a research team to draft and Academic Draft
   for the BM of 'Obligations.
   The law makirig procedure is as follows:
   First a team of university professors or recognized experts in the specific
   field of law to be regulated is asked to conduct a research, resulting in an
   Academic Draft for a BM.
   The Academic Draft, which may be drafted by anyone, including the IVationat
   Law Rqform Agency or BPHN, or any ministerial departrnent is then sent to
   the Directorate General for Legislation in thg Departrnent of Justice, where a
   new team of some 20 (twenty) people is formed to draft the Bill itselfL
   After the Bill is completed and agreed by the respective Minister, including
   the Minister of Justice (and HumaTl Rights), the BM is registered in the
   Parliamentaiy National Legislattve Program {1b'qgram Legislatif IVlrzsionae and
   in due time the Bil1 wil1 be discussed and debated in Parliament, tinti1 finally
   it is agreed by and between Parliament and the Govemment.
                                                       '           '' ' tt  tt t                 '  '        '
   The final step consist of the signing and enacting of the Bill by the President
                                                                       'and tihe publications of inlthrough the State Gazette.
2. The following is a preliminary research report conducted for the National
   Law Reform Agency of the Department ofJustice on a Bil1 for a National Law
   of Obligations, which considered amongst otihers : the use of the term
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   "obligadon". The term "obligationY is used quite correctily since it
   corresponds with the Dutch word "verbintenis", denoting that a legal
   connection has been made between two parties that imply rights and
   obligations. On the one hand, one party has the right to demand, while the
   other party is obligated to fulfll that de nand (Pro£ Subekti,SH).
3. Whereas, the terrn "agreemene is a translation of the wQrd "overeenkonsf,
   which is an event where two persons or parties agree uPon something. This
   event covers a series of promises (Pro£ Subekti,SH ibidem).
                                                   '4. For' these reasons, all terms used in this paper denoimg "verbintenis" are
   translated into "penkatan" ; and all terms denoting "overeenkomst" are
   translated into "peijanjian".
5. There is still another term that is being used lateiy, namely the term
   "contrace. This term has a,narrower connotation as it is limited to its
   meaning as "written business contracts".
   Therefore we sti11 suggest to use the term "peny'anjian".
6. Another word that is often used next to "pecianjian" is the word
   "persetuljuan" for agreement. To my mind, "persetiijuan" refers to the
   process of events, while "perp'anjian" refers to the end-result of that process.
   In tihis context we talk about written 'agreernents and oral agreements.
7. Consistency in the diffbrence in meaning between obligation (verbintenis) on
   the one hand and agreement on the other is shown in the explanation to
   Artiofe 1233 BW !: "Alle verbintenissen ontstaan of uit overeenlconst, of de
   wet", meaning that obligations originate either from an agreement or from
   legislation.
iBWistheaboreviationofCivi1CodeorCC,
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8. Referring to Article 1233 BW, we arrive at the core problem of our system in
   the Law of Obligations.
   The pimciple that an obligation originates, on the one hand from an
   agreement and on the other from legislation, can, according to the writer be
   adhered to.
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9. When this principle is acceptable, then all following articles on the Law on
   Obligations tihal, in fact, are an explanation of this system, must, as a.
                                       'consequence also be acceptable. '
10.The Law is a cornprehensive systgm. And the Law on Obligation is no
   exception. To make partial exceptions on the Law on Obligation wil1 collapse
   the very system of the Law.
11.If, by this reasoning the principle system on the Law of Obligations is
   acceptable, then the next question 'will be, how must we approach the body
   of e>cplanations of tihis Law, article per aiticle?
   Since the total system on the Law on Obtigations with explanations of each
   of its articles form one inseparal)le entity, then the e>rplanations of its
   articles must also be accepted. Exceptions will be only in those areas that
  haye already been regulated in part or in toto in our national legislation, as,
  for instance, in the Law of agreements on Lease and Rents.
                                           '12.By mentioning this fact, the writer in no way denies that our.Law on
   Obligations has partly become out-dated. It will, indeed, be ideal that
  Indonesia possesses a National system on the Law of Obligations, which is
  whole, complete and according to our legal aspirations.
   But, legislative drafters understand that the forming of a National Law on
   Obligations is no easy task.
!
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13.Legislative drafters usually find themsekes facing with two extreme
   alternatives.
   Either to overhaul the old legislation; or to accept and take over the old
   legislation. Because of their extreme nature, they both have their drawhacks
   and shortcomings.
i41?eUcto'ng alWteernMaUttS ePake a choice between the two, the writer prefers the
         '   IJIrst(!h because drafting a new Law on Obligations already poses many
   problems from the outset that require a long time of discussions.
   Secondly, the complete overhaul of old legislation with a completely new
   one, unless well prepared, wil1 result in a Law that is far from perfect.
   Thintlg, and this is most important, the Law on Obligations is a neutral
   area of law and does not contain sensitive substance.
   Fburthly, in fact some regulations in the Law of Obligations in the CC have
   references that are quoted widely by the public when concluding
   agreements, both written as well as oral.
   Fij}htg) the Law may be perfected through case law.
   VVhen we study the renewal of the Civil Law in the Netherlands,.for
   instance, we see that its process had taken no less than half a century.
   This luxury, however, this country can not afford.                       1･
15.What has been referred to above applies in particular to the national aspects
  of the Law on Obligations.
ll
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    However, in its international context, and in this era of globalization, the
    area of law, in particular the Law on Obligations, is influenced by the
    Convention Law and the Community Law. (see Roy Goode, Reflections on
    the Harmonization of Commercial Law,.....}
    Here, what is me'ant by Convention Law is fbr instance, the Vienna
    Convention on the Sale of Goods, while Community Law covers, among
    others, the "Directisres to the European Economic Community"
      '
    Roy Goode furtiher mentions that the Law on Obligations in its international
    context is faced with issues that are now better known as the
    hamonization of laws.
    Harmonizationoflawsmaybeachievedthroughthefollowingmeans:
    1. A multilateral convention without a Uniform Law as such:
    2. A multilateral convention embodying a Uniform Law;
   3. A set ofbilateral treaties;
    4. Communlty legislation, typically a Dire¢tive;
    5. A model Law;
   6. A codifTication of custom and usage promulgated by an international
      non-govemmental organization;
   7. International trade temis promulgated by such an organization;
   8. Model contracts and general contractual conditions;
                   '   9. Restatements by scholars and other experts.
                      '                  '         '        '   Sooner or later Indonesia must face these issues, especially in this era of
   regional groupings where neighbouring countries need to harmonize their
   laws.
16.0ne of the first areas that will be impacted by regionalization, and for that
   reason needs to be har moni2ed first, is the Law on Obligations.
85
   Hovv do we approach the issue of harmonization? Although harrnonization
   of laws is within the area of International Civil Law, yet in draftiing the Law
   of Obligations we must be aware of possibhities.
17,Outside the impact of globalization on our National Law of Obligations, there
  are several matters that need our attention when we adjust or change the
  Law of Obligations in its present form as fbund in the Third Book of the Civil
  Code.
!
i
'
   F7irst and foremost is the prineiple of consensus. We all agree that the
   principle of consensus wil1 be the basis for our future Law of Obligations.
   However, we must focus on the moment when such consensus is reached.
   Until now generally it is understood that consensus is reached at one
   certain point in time. In reality, in its development, this consensus is
   reached not only at a certain moment, but in fact, it forrns a process. In
   this connection we know of the process at pre-contract, at time of signing
   thecontract,andduringimplemerrtationofcontract. Therefore,whenwe
   are now asked about the exact moment that an obligation is born, which in'
   Article 1233 of BW is so readily formulated with the wordings tihat
   obligations are born from an agreement, - then we are faced with a problem
   that is not so easily answered.
18."Injrormatieptiew (obligation to inform) and "Onderzoekspliche (obligation to
  investigate)
   Dudng the last decade a new thought has developed namely that panies
   bound in a contract, wil1 each have Dbligations to perfbrm.
   In outline it can be said that the creditor (the party who extends
   somethinglgoods and receives something in return) is obliged to provide
   suficient information on what he is extending. Conversely, the debtor
   party {the party who receives somethinglgoods and for that reason extends
   an amount for payment) must investigate or research and act prudently, so
i
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that the counter-perfbrmance received is commensurate with pembrmance
provided and vice versa. With this explanation, the writer has airived at
the second Article of the Law of Obligations which says that an obligation is
aimed to provide something, to per Ebrm something and to not perform those
actions as formulated in Article 1234 BW.,
Or, jumping ftuther to Article 1338 BW, this mentions that a contractmust be made in good faith. '
With the obligation to inform and the obligation to investigate, the term
"good faith" must be placed in a different context than heretofore has been
understood.
This is even before discussing aspe¢ts that have caused the decline of the
supremacy of the principle of freedom to make agreements.
The declme in the supremacy of the principle to make agreements brings us
to even more basic questions in our Law of Obligations, which must force
us to change several of its principles and articles.
19.Does the princtple of freedom to make agreements sdl1 exist?
   The ptmciple of freedom to make agreements is one of the cornerstones of'
                           'our Law of Obligations. The regulations on the Law of Obligations, at least
   in its written form,,is found in the Third Book of the Civll Code (BW). .'
   The existence of this principle is reflected in Article 1338 of the Civil Code
   that mentions that all agreements that are legally based wil1 act as Law to
   those parties who made these. This means that those parties entering an
   agreement can agree on any matter between them. For as long as whatever
   is agreed upon is legal, meaning not in contradiction with the law, social
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order and m'orals, the agreement is bindmg to those parties in the same
way as laws are. And therefore, thgy may not contravene it.
However, with tirne, the freedom to make contracts has declined, as parties
in the contract are no longer allowed to agree on matters as they wish. In
certain cases, parties are not bound to what they hasre agreed in the
contract. This indicates a decline in the supremaqy of the freedom to make
                                                               ''                                                'tt         '         '                                         '
                                                'There are $everal reasons for this that origiJtiate from the internal
                        'developments of the !aw of contracts itself, as weU as frorn outside, which
we will discuss as follows:
20. [he Role of the Lega! System
   An agreement does not exist in a vacuum. Desptce the fact that Article 1338
   BW clearly mentions that all agreernents that are legally made are binding
   as law for those who signed, this however, does not mean that the law as
   found in the agreement made by both parties can be separated from the
                      '   legal system that covers it.
                           '                          '
   Article 1338 BW uses the words "yang dihuat secara sah" (legally made}.
   This means that whatever has been agreed upon by the parties is valid as
   law, for as long as whatever has been agreed is legal, meaning not
   contravening the law, social order apd morals.
   In the case where the agreement contravenes the law, social order and
   ethicS then tihe contract is invalid by law ivan rechtswege nietist.
   The fact that the freedom to contract is limited by the legal system that
   covers the contract, - resulting in the fact that whatever has been agreed by
   the parties must not contravene the law, social order and morals, - this
forrns a logical constraint that ensues from the fact
allowed to exist only within a certain legal system.
The wish to introduce a "lex-mercatoria", especially in
international civil laws must for this reason.remain
remains that contract law stin remains part of the legal
country,
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a contract is
the framework of
a wish. The f ct
system of a given
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21.The Principle of Good Faith.
   From the very beginning the principle of good faith has influenced the law
   on contracts. This principle was even identified in the statutes. Line 3 of
   the above-mentioned article, i.e. Article 1338 BW mentions tihat all
   agreements must be made on good faith.
   What does "good iaith" actually denote? In the law on contracfs good faith
   is based on its being reasonable andjust. The first is concerned with reason
   and the second with emotions. Both principles remind us of the concept of
   (kecermatan yang patut dalam hidup bermasyarakaij as mentioned in
                         '   Article 1365 BW on acts violating the law.
   Good faith in the contractual context indicates that there is a legal
   relationship between two or more parties. While the terrn "heceimatan yang
   patut dalam pergaulan hidup bermasyarakae is used where no agreement
                                                    'hastakenplace. .'' '
   Good faith implies that there is a contractual relation, and therefore is
   cai'i'ed a relationshi'p concept. Whereas ='kecermatan serta tcezpatutuan datam
  pergaulan hidup berrnasyarakae is used in its general concept. However, in
   fact, the meaning of both is the same, says ProL Mr. P.L. Wehry in his
   explanations on "Legal Developments of Good Faith in the Netherlands".
1
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                                    '
    Still citing Pro£ Wehry, good faith has two functions. Both these functions
   impact on the principle of freedom to contract.
22.Two Functions of Good Faith.
   Its first function:
                                                               ''                                                   '  '           '   Good falth can add to the contents of a contraet and can also add to the
                                                   'meaningsofwordingsinthelawsoncQntract. , ' .
   For example, in 1921 the High Court in Holland made a verdict on
   corporations or firms {HR.10 February 1921; NJ No.409),: "that although
   the law does not prevent a fum to establish another im which competes
   with the old firm, but based on good faith, this is not allowed"
   Therefore, in this case good faith adds, fills in discrepencies and completes
   that are not yet regulated by law. Is then the general principle of law not
   good faith?
   Its second function
   In its second function, good faith limits and annuls. This second function
   has actually been accepted in the doctrine before WWII, although the legal
   system of the time was stil1 reluctant to concede.
   Most famous example was the verdict ef the High Court of the Netherlands
   on the amount of debts related to the rapid fal1 of the German Mark in
   1931.TheverdictisknownasMarkisMarkArrest.
   The verdict is concerned with the question as who must bear the risk of
   ,fiuctuating exchange rates in a loan contract? According toe Anicle 1756
iI
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BW such risk is with the creditor. Based on this article, however, in the
1931 verdict that the debtor only needed to repay the amounts of Marks he
borrowed from the creditor, despite the fact that the value of the Mark had
dropped drastically. (The original loan was DM125,OOO at a rate of
DM'1=F.O.69; while at dme of repayment the value of DM125,OOO had
dropped to below 1 cent.). The principle on good faith may lmit the
implementation of Article 1756 BW.
The Indonesian legal system has for long now made a fairer formulation.
The Implementation of Article 1756 BW is lmited by the principle of good
faith. This fbrmulation is used when there are fluctuations in the exchange
rate, even when this is not mentioned earlier.
Most recent verdict based on this formulation was made in 1988 on the
case of S.T. Silalahi against Suryono & co.
The Supreme Court ruled that to solve a civi1 case involving changes in
exchange rate, the formulation used is that risks on rates of exchange must
be borne by both parties in equal rneasure using the price of gold as
benchmark This fbrmulation has become common jurisprudence unti1
today.
l
Lr
23. Undue Infiuence
                                           ''           '   Thus far the law knows 3 (three) reasons why a contract is no longer
   binding to those who made it, these are reason of force, rnisleading and
   fraud. In the case where one of the tihree reasons have caused losses to
   one party, beeause there has been force, misleading or fraud, an
    annulment bf the contract can be requested. Therefore, we see that, in fact
   the freedom to contract is already lintited. Indeed, Article 1338 BW
   stipulates that what binds the two parties to the contract with the force of
   law are such agreements as what they themsebees have legally put into the
!
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contract, insofhr as this does not contravene the system of law, social order
and morals.
l
  In its further derrelopment, reasons mentioned in the law, including force,
  misleading and fraud are no longer the only reasons used to free a person
  from the obligations of contract.
  Now, there is a fburth reason that is used to release a person from the
                                      ''      '  obligations of contract, which lies outside the scope of law {at least iri this
             '  country). This reason is known as undue influence (rrzisbruik uan
  omsiandighedeaj.
  Seen from the point of balance between the two parties in a contract, then
  an existing imbalance becomes one item in undue infiuence, which is not
  the imbalance between delivery and counter-delivery.
  Rather, such imbalance has its emphasis on the process of the contract.
  Therefore, the school on undue influence does not onlyjustifY the doctrines
  on undue causes (ongeoorioofde oorzaaig, but rather focusses on impaired
 will. The party that is under undue influence is not free to determine his
 will. One speaks, therefore, of impaired wi11 (witsgehreig, as the founh
 reason for annulment of contract besides the elements of force, misleading
  and fraud. The imbalance must be sought in the position of the parties
 involved in a contract.
I
There having been a loss suf!bred as a result of such imbalance of positions
becomes a condition in the case of undue infiuence.
The annulment of a contract for reason of undue influence is not annulled
through law, Such annuiment may be requested by the party who feels the
loss. This amulment may also occur even to a contract made before a
notary.
1/
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Annulment does not need to involve the entire contract. Partial annulment
is also permitted.
In 1985 The Supreme Court made a ruling which is better known as the
Luhur Sundoro case, with legal implications as follows:
. Despite the fact that the contract made in q notaiy act is legal, - where
   one person empowers another to sell the house in dispute to a third
   party or to himself, however, taking into consideration its history where
   tihe letter of attorney was made as a result of the house being made a
   collateral undl such time of repayment, and as debts were not repaid in
   time, the contract was changed into a power of attorney to sell the
   house, - such a contract becomes a quasi contract, being in fact a
   replacementofitsoriginalcontrzactregardingloans. ,,,..
   Furthermore, as the debtor was already tied to other loan contracts that
   already passed verdicts by the courts, and were, therefore, in force, the
   debtor was as a consequence placed in a weak position and under
   duress. When he was then forced to sign the items of contract in the
   notary act tojustify him, the ensuing contract may tihen be classified as
   a one-sided contract, which in casu is urp'ust if wholly enforced upon
   the debtor."
. Because the debtor had admitted to his debts and had placed his hQuse
   as collateral, fUrthermore, had given power to the creditor to (hipotiig'
   the house,- it must be concluded that the house in' dispute hqd been
   promised to the creditor as repayment of his debts, which for the sake
   of fairness must be added with 2% per month, counting from the date
   that the debt was made.
   For fairness sake, the house in dispute that was already impounded for
   other cases, must therefore be auctioned to repay other creditors."
1L
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      The basis fbr such ruling rerninds us of considerations in the Dutch case
      law on "misbruile van omstandighederf or undue infiuence. According to
      the doctrine and jurisprudence of that country, m.v.o is ari impairn!ent of
      the founh will besldes that of the other three classical impairments of force,
      misleading 'and fraud. Ever since the new Civi1 Code was enforced in this
      country, m.v.o. or undue influence as the fourth impairment of will has
      been installed in the legal system.
                                                     ' tt                         t tt      There is a Dutch fairy tale that is often cited to describe undue influence,
      which ProL Mr. JLP Cohen relates as follows: '
           tt
      Onceuponatimetherewasadaxxghterofawheatmiller,whofoundherseif
      placed in a cliffTicult situation, because her parents boasted that she could
      weave wheat into gold thread.
      The king believed and asked the gh1 to demonstrate her ahility. if she
      succeeded the king would take her. as queen. If not, then she would be
      ki11ed. In this very dMcult situation, suddenly there appeared a goblm, who
      said that he could hetp her with her task on one condition, that once the
      girl became queen, she must give her first born child to him.
      It is, therefore, not surprising that the girl immediately agreed to the
      proposition, but it is also not surprising that when the girl became queen,
      she failed on her promise.
     The moral of the lesson is: a promise is binding. But there is no obligation
' whenitisgivenunderduress.
             '              '
                          '  24. Development of Standard Contracts
                                      '                '
      A contract or agreement always implies that there are two parties invokwed,
      whether they are debtor and creditor, or seller and buyer.
/l
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 A contract follows an agreement. DeErpite the fact that, according to the
 latest thoughts, an agreement ean not be viewed as merely one point in
 the entire process of the agreement, the fact that. there is agreement
 always implies that there has been negotiations. An agreement occurs
 only after due process of negotiations where all conditions in the
 agreement had been discussed.
 The term "process" also implies that a time frame was required.
 Therefore, nowadays, an agreement is no longer considered as a mere
 point or rnoment in the process towards that agreernent, In 1989
J.B.M.Vtanken isSued a book in the Netheriands entitled: "bfededelings,
informatie and OnclerzoeiCspZichten in het verbintenissenrecht"
 (Announcements, Information and Investigattve responsibilities in the Law
 of Obligations}. The titie clearly explains its contents. In the Law of
 Obligations there exists the responsibraty to armounce, inlIorm and
investigate. Parties to the contract are responsible to inform each other
and investigate all aspects pertaining to the contract. The aim being to
attain a well-balanced contract that is founded on equal consent by both
What happens in practice does not always follow this advice. In general,
one of the parties to the contract who holds a position of monopoly, will
always try to deterrnine conditions one-sidedly. The other party, who
holds no bargaining position must usually accept whatever conditions are
mentionedintheagreement,onthebasisoftakeitorteaveit. '
                '                                   ''            '      ' '
This situation is seen daily, whether these conditions are prescribcd by a
laund;y, hotel or photo-printing. This does not even stop here. Large
¢ompanies who hold monopolistic positions have already printed their
draft contracts ready for signing by his business partner. [this is also done
by state companies such as in Telecommunieations, Public Utilities etc.
e:
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Does the freedom to contract then stil1 exist in tthis case? AlthQugh this
practice is widely accepted and is allowed, the question remains as in how
fatr do these private companies (who hold monopolies} have the atithority
to determine conditions of contract, that, in fact, according to Article 1338
BW is provided to both parties to the contract? From the point of view of
Article 1338 BW a contract is, in faet, a law. And where all contracts are
made according to a spechic standard model, then, what is actually
happening here is.,- to borrow the term of the Dutch writer, Sluijter,-privatelegislation.. .' - .                           '                                  '                            '     ' '
This is because those conditions as deterrnined by the company in the
al)ove eontract have become law, and, therefore, no longer form an
agreement. Pitlo even goes so fhr as to call this a "dwang-contrace, or a
                                                        .mandatory contract. Nonetheless, another well-known wnter, Asser
Rutten in his book "Handletcting tot de BeoeLfening van het IVederlands
Burgeriijk Wetboeh 1974, states that " Every person who signs an
agreement is responsible for tihe contents (of the agreement) which he (or
she) has sigried. Whenever a person adds his (or her) signature to a form
of agreement on a book, that signature raises confidence that the
signatory is aware･of and wants the book, whose form he (or she} ha.s
sigried. It is not possible for someone to sign any (agreement} whose
contents he is not aware oP. (Pro£ Dr. Mariam Darus Badrulzaman SH,
"Asas Kebebasan Betkontrak dan Kaitannya dengan Peng'arg'ian",
BukulStandard, Makalah pada Upgrading Notaris, 27 April 1993.)
However, up to now this country has no regulations on standard
contracts, In my view, negative excesses of a standard contract rnay be
eliminated by using the theory of good intentions and abuse of
circumstances.
One point is clear, though, and that is that with proliferation of standard
contracts, the principle of freedom to contract is reduced.
ti
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25.The Law as an Instrument for E¢onomie Policy Making
The declme iri the freedom to contract is also caused by the use oflaw as
instrument for Economic Policy-making. The use of law as instrument for
economic policy-making is not new. During the world economic crisis in
the 1920's, the Netherlands introduced what it called "Crisistvetgeving",
which are legislation to overcome the economic crisis. In Indonesia this
kind of legislation was used in the 1950S, that even emerged in the form
of the Criminal Economic Law. Here interaction was created between the
law and the economy. And as a result a new branch of leaming was
estahlished, that of Economic Law.
The most apparent trait of Economic law is its regulating role. This
regulatory role of !atAT, taken in its widest sense, - aimed to propel growth
and development of the economy,- is the reason why the law remains no
longer the basis for legal policies only. (What we now see is that) the role of
law has now shifted to become ari instrument ofpolicy-making.
The shift in the role of law then caused changes in the stmcture and form
regulating the laws themselves. Especially laws in tiheir wr itten form.
                                                               'Ever since the French Revolution it was an established fact that Laws (in
their formal sense) are the ehief products and form of Legislation.
Laws as a product of parliament, and viewed as a means to limit the
                                                                  'powers of the King {read: the Authoijties) - have recorded .all principles of
law that are required to regulate life in society. Ih its later development,'
Laws no longer occupy a central position. Especially since the growth and
developmerrt of Economic Law. The reason for tihis lies the process of its
inception, where Economic Law was based on delegated legislation. Here
weseeregulatinglawbydelegationofpower.
l
l
                                                                 97
For these reasons, the principles of Economic Law do not all appear in the
forrn of Laws (in their formal sense). They appear in such forms as
Govemment Regulations, Presidential Decisions, Mmisterial Decisions etc.
Most recent example (in the 1980s) in this country are regulations known
as Paktri, Pakto, Pakdes etc. which in essence are policies made by the
Authorities in the field of economy in the forrn of written regulations
(laws).
                                                            '   ' ' '  '
As example, Mmisterial Decision of the Minister of Finan¢e No.1548 dated
4 December 1990 to regulate (!) the stock market, refers to Law No. 15 of
1952. Article 7 of this Law establishes that contravention of any rules in
this regulation made by the Mmister of Finance based on the Law, is a
crime. Although this is not unusual in delegated legislation, these
authorities must be used with care, especially when these are 1inked to
legislation and legalities. To cite the words of Pro£ Padmo Wabj'ono, the
formation of laws based on delegated legislation must not divert from the
most important principles of legislqtion, namely the ranldng of strength
(hierarchy) of regulations. Regulations of lower rank must not contain
legal norms which are outside, or worse stil1 contravene those of higher
rank. It is natural that a Govemment Regulation may not be made
against the Law. However, it must be conceded that this principle is not
always adhered to.
Furher, Mr. NG Kalergis-Mavrogenis, legal writer of the Netheriands, in his
book: The power and non-power of the legislator,1978, says that excessive
use of delegated legislation may result in non-power of the legislator. The
power of the legislator has then shMed to the executive, or to the
administrator.･Therefore, regulations will then be channeled tihrough the
function of the administration.
The impact of the development of economic law is mostly felt in the area of
Civi1 Law, especially in the field ofLaw of Obligations and Contracts. The
growth of eeonomie law runs parallel with the receding of the freedom to
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contract. Eeonomic Law that appears in its form as Public Law, is
mandatory in nature. As a result, the essential nature of regulation in the
Law of Obligations recedes to the background.
What do we face in delegated legislation?
.FZir:st of al1, for a certain lengtih of ime, we will face a situation that is
equal to a vacuum in the rule of law. Whenever, for example a certain
article in a specifie law mentions that ensuing regulations will be
established in a Govemment Regulation, then this means that fbr a
certain period, until those ensuing regulations are estahlished, we wil1 find
a vacuum in the law.
Seconalg, over and above that - and this is most important - we actually
face a vacuum in the provision of norms. The substance of these norms
have (through such measures) been relegated by the legislators (meaning
the Govemment and Parliament) to the executive,
                                       'Now more and rnore aspects of Contract Lavv shew traits of public law that
are mandatory in nature. [[herefore, the basic principle of Contract Law
that gives freedom to both parties to commonly agree on what wil1 be
accepted as law and binding to both parties, is now no longer completely
valid.
The phnciple of freedom to contract is in fact founded on the assumption
that both parties invobeed in the contract are of equal strength, seen from
the social as well as economic aspects. In reality this is rarely found. So
that, therefore, tihe question is not so much on how we may give equal
treatment to both parties, as to what measure of quality do we give to each
party, in order that they may both be on an equal level.
Here we see the positive role of Economic Law at work. The aiithorities
have come down by issuing regulations and !aws that provide protection to
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the party that i.s socially and economically in weaker position. This is seen,
for instance, in the case of consumer protection and product lial)raty.
Decision of tihe Minister of Firiance no. 48 of 1991 dated 19 January 1991,
on the subject of leasing, shows tihis kind of protection. The Decision says
that leasing is a guided contract. A guided contract, according to noted
writer Polak, is a contract whose conditions are based, not only on the
basis of freedom to contract and on mutual consent by both parties, but
whose minimal requirement must be to protect tl}e weaker party.
This can be seen for i.nstance in 1inicle 8 of the above Decision.
                          '''
However, when we compare this with similar regulations in the
Netherlands on contract to buy and seN by installments, we see that the
ahove-mentioned Ministerial Decision does not yet contain norms that are
substantial in nature. Article 1576 C of the Civi1 Code of that couritry,
governing buying and selling by installments, includes a default clause.
This is a condition in the agreement where the deadline falls befbre due
date. This clause is applicable where ifone instnllment has been made, at
least one tenth of total value of sales price must be paid; and in the case
where soveral installments have been made, at least one twentieth of total
value of sales price must be paid.
We fbresee that regulating laws in Economic Law will have no small
impact on the general development of Indonesia's Laws of the future.
:
26. In the context of international civi1 matters, the freedom to contract is often
    punctuated by a choice of law, which is limited by - what is known as -
    public policy.
    Both parties agree that in the imp!ementation of the contract and its
    implications, the contract shall adhere to the law of choice. Therefore, the
    principle question here must be whether the parties may choose their
    choice of law regardless? The answer to this is: negative.
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The main issue in the choice'of law is the balance between the freedom to
contract on the one hand and public policy (ketertt'ban umum) on the other.
On the one hand the principle of freedom to c6ntract justifies a choice of
law. On the other hand, public policy limits the extent of choice.
"Choice of law in civi1 and commercial matters is characterized by two
contradictory phenomena: party autonomy and mandatory rules of a public
law nature" (Rene van Rooi, Maurice V. Polak, Private International Law in
the Netherlands)
             '
Choice of law may be made for as long as this does not contravene public
poliey.
Supreme Court Regulation No.1 of 1990 on the system in the
implementation verdicts involving Foreign Arbitration says that what js
meant with the term Mpublic policy" are basic principles pertaining to the
entire Iegal and social system of Indonesia".
Choice of law may also not mean cr avoidance of law". In the doctrine,
avoidance of law is sometimes called choice of law, in its incorrect
meaning; whereas "choice of law" must be made with its correct meaning.
                                    '                           'In choice of law we are faced with points of contacts, including citizenship,.
domicile, and tocat]ion of item. Choice of law may be made only where
relevant points of contact exist.
However, ari atroidance of 1auT, is precisely an effbrt to infiuence those
points of contact. For example, relevant parties may change their
citizenship, location of item in question or location where the contract was
made.
'l
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Choice of law may only be made in the area of contract law; this is the area
that is known as regulating la:w. Choice of law is prohibited for example in
the area of forced law.
Even in contract law, the freedom to make a choice of law is limited.
Choice of law, for instance is prohibited in labour contracts.
                                                               '         'Choice of law can only bejustified when thete exists a point of contact.
                                                            ''                            ''                     '                        '
In the meantime, choice of law of both parties may.be set aside when a
stronger point of contact is in existence that is stronger than the actual
choice of law itsett The following example cited by Pro£ Kollewij'n is often
quoted, as follows:" When ari Argentine citizen and a Dutch citizen, both
domiciled in the Netherlands make a contract fbr goods to be transported
from Domburg to Grorringen and both panies choose to act under
Argenhne laW, then, according to Kollewij'n the choice of the Dutch law by
thejudge is a far stronger (choice)".
Therefore, choice of law is lmited by particular systems of law only, namely
those that have the most characteristic connection. It is not allowed to
choose a law that has no connection whatsoever with the contract. Choice
of law may be made onlg with hona fide intentz'on (Summary from Prof. Mr.
Dr. S. Gautama, Pengantar Hukum Perdata Internasional Indonesia,
1977).
27. The Impact of the Era of Globalization
                                              '    The freedom to con.tract is also effeeted by the era of globalization. With
    more transnational contracts made, more agreements were rnade by parties
    in Indonesia, in particular between an Indonesian and a foreign party who
    have chosenjurisdiction under foreign law.
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 In the context of choice of law we see that the jurisdiction of a foreign law -
limited by the principles of public policy as explained above - has been, in
this instance, chosen on purpose by parties involved. in the contract. Here
the word "on purpose" is used, as the possibMty exists that choice of law
was made in secret. Whereas, as a result of globalization, it is also possible
that regulating laws of one country crosses its geographic borders without
intention and not on purpose, even against the wi11 of parties involved in
the contract. Here we see the indi¢ations of transnational reach ofnational
regulations.
In this ever-smaller world, more ahd more transnational relations occur in
the area of law. Facing the impact of law {and economy) from overseas,
countries do not all take the sarne stance and attitude. Take for instance
the attitude of the Latiri American countries. ln the last decade there was
what is known as the Calvo Doctrine (originahng from Carlos Calvo, an
Argentine lawyer), who was of the principle that "a forcigner bg entering a
coump to do business implicitly consents to be treated as are nationatfirms.
This means that a .foret'gn firm does not have the right to invoke the
protection of its own govemment in investment cltsputes," These Laim
American counnies, are, for instance reluctant to join the Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The Board of arbitration of
ICSID opens the possibility fbr settling disputes on capital investment
between a foreigner and the government where investment is made.
However, lately the implementation of the Calvo Doctme by Lahn
American countries seems to have relaxed. More ahd more countries now
offer protection towards foreign ownership through what is called as
investment guarantee agreements.
We have from university days been taught on the imitations of validity of
legal regulations. This refers to the scope and range ofjurisdiction of
certain regulating laws, its tirne of validity, persons who are included under
,'
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the regu!ation, and limitation pert]aining to the territory where this
jurisdiction prevails.
As to the latter, the territory ofjurisdiction is bounded by the tenitory of
the country where jurisdiction is made which at the sarne time reflects the
sovereign boundaries of that country.
"Although the jurisdiction of national laws is normally limited to the
particular natioh, the reality is that actions taken outside the national
boundaries can affect competition within the national market", thus
Robock & Stmmonds, in International Business & Multinational
Enterprises, 1989. P. 188 and on.
  '    'It is on the basis of these principles of thought that certain countries,
through their actions, expand their country's reach qfjurisdiction into
         pt" 'rk'tenitories of other nations. "In recognition of this reality the US Courts
have extended the US antitrust laws to actions ahroad that substantially
affect the cornmerce of tihe US and competition in the US market", say
Robock & Simmonds further. In tihis context, fbr example, a verdict made
by a foreign arbitration body outside the territory of the United States on a
commercial contract, which contravenes the Antitr'ust Law of the United
States, can not be validated and may not be implemented within the United
States. Thus, indirectly the Anti Trust Law of the United States has
acquired the power of extra-territorial reach, that extend to cases outside
the territorialjurisdiction of the United States. .
Indirectiy, this also limits the freedom of the parties to bind themselves in a
contract (of arbitration}.
